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Abstract 
 
The scope of this note is to delimitate what we are t lking about when we refer to governance, a 
word that relates to different concepts in political sciences, social sciences and other human 
sciences. Within such a large meaning, governance eompasses many situations where there are 
risks to be managed, or risks to be taken, which leads us to question its economic foundations. 
However, the foundations need not be the same if we consider “corporate governance”, “national 
governance”, “territorial governance” and many compund ways of management through Public 
Private Partnerships (PPP). 
 
Field of research: Governance, Economy of risks. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Governance” comes from the Greek kubernan (to pilot, to manage) and the word extended to 
managing firms (governance), states (governments), and more generally projects, or social events. 
For social organizations without a well defined political or juridical status it may be said that there’s 
a “lack of governance”. Distinct from “government” or from “management” the concept was first 
developed for firms: “corporate governance” to be later extended to other fields that we may call 
“public governance”. 
The notions of risk and uncertainty arose in Europe in parallel with the notion of governance 
although their origins and their meanings varied a lot through ages. Risk was the first notion to 
arise, mainly in finance as a way to recognize thatsome investments where “risky” whatever the 
laws, omen, and oaths that guaranteed their returns. Thi  notion made it possible to lend at a rate of 
return that exceeded the “price of time” (non-usurary te of return): the difference being the “price 
of risk”. 
In order to distinguish scientific certainty from lack of knowledge Knight, Ramsey and Keynes in 
the 1920’s, proposed to label situations where probabilities were known or could be figured out as 
“situations of risk”, in opposition to situations where there is no scientific certainty in the above 
sense that they dubbed: “uncertainty”. 
This explains many of the confusion in the use of the word risk. Indeed, a “security”, i.e. a share in a 
firm, doesn’t guarantee returns with a given probability, and that’s what a typical financial risk is! 
Climate change induces risks for agriculture, e.g., without enough scientific certainty to measure 
possible outcomes with reliable probabilities. Hence this is typically an uncertain situation although 
we refer to it as “climate change risk”.  
An explanation for this confusion may come from two different definitions of probabilities. The 
first one, discovered by Pascal and Huygens in the 17th century, is obtained whether by calculus or 
by statistics. The second one, introduced by De Finetti (1931) and Savage (1952) are based on 
decision theory in situations of uncertainty where it is the decision maker that reveals through its 
preferences on uncertain outcomes a subjective measure of their occurrence. Such a subjective 
measure is mathematically a probability in terms of proprieties, but is an individual one. For 
instance, an expert advice, even if well informed on a phenomenon, is often based on a subjective 
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probability, not an objective one. In such a case we find ourselves in a situation of uncertainty, nota 
situation of risk, even though the word risk is generally used in practice. 
To conclude this presentation of risks, let us differentiate: 
- Risks that one faces: such as climate risk, floods, epidemics, social revolutions and the like. 
- Risk that one takes: any decision we make is risky, ometimes with such a little variance that we 
can consider the expected result as certain, most of the time with a known probability of loss that 
we consider as acceptable, and many a time without any idea about the probabilities of occurrence, 
unless a subjective one. 
- Individual risks: borne or taken by an individual with consequences that are only of concern for 
this individual. 
- Collective risks: borne by a collectivity of individuals, whether the risk is taken or managed by the 
collectivity or by some individuals. Collective risks concern: human environments (“nature” as 
some will say), social, economical, industrial and political risks, notably. 
Countries around the world are confronted with common environmental challenges caused by 
natural hazards (e.g. earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, forest fires, desertification, drought, and 
landslides), technological risks (e.g. fire, air accidents, and industrial explosions), common risks 
(e.g. pollution, waste management), socio-economic risks (e.g. unemployment, poverty) and 
financial risks (e.g. credit risk, investments, hedging instruments). And, alongside, new risks have 
emerged such as: terrorism risk, nuclear risk, etc. 
Contracts are the natural way to deal with risks: Lottery tickets, financial contracts, insurance 
contracts etc. Nowadays, contracts ore often used a a way to complete the delegation of authority 
provided by law or as a means of managing political cooperation.  
 
2.  Theoretical foundations of governance 
 
We are concentrating here on an economics and management science point of view and more 
particularly on risks management methods in different fields. These have been developed in the 
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context of corporate governance; however they are also called for its extension to public governance 
at the price of some adjustments.  
In general, governance refers to how an organization makes its decisions and implements them. The 
contract concept has become essential in the economic analysis of organizations. 
The contractual approach can analyze the functioning of micro-economic and macro-economic 
interactions and those of the institutional framework f applied economics. These institutions, 
which define the rules of the game, form what the Nw Institutional Economics (NIE) calls 
“institutional environment”. They may contribute to the implementation “enforcement” of contracts, 
whether formal (administration, judiciary and professional associations) or informal (culture, habits 
and customs) (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002). 
We argue that the theory of property rights and agency theory provide satisfactory explanations for 
the emergence of the concept of corporate governance that will be extended to public governance. 
Contracts in economics are characterized by three th ories: the theory of incentives (IT), the theory 
of incomplete contracts (TIC) and the theory of trans ction costs (TCT), each of these resting on 
different hypothesis. 
 
2.1. Corporate governance 
 
Tirole (2001) pointed out that the standard definitio  of corporate governance among economists 
and legal scholars refers to the defense of sharehold r’s interests. From Adam Smith (1776) to Berle 
and Means (1932), the concern is the separation of ownership and control, i.e. with the agency 
relationship between a “principal” (investors, outsiders) and an “agent” (manager, entrepreneur, 
insiders). 
The problems that corporate governance faces arise from the separation of ownership and control of 
the capital, the disproportional power of certain shareholders, the control over minority 
shareholders, the employees holding significant rights regardless of those who they are entitled as 
capital owners. Corporate governance, framed by laws nd accounting rules (e.g. International 
Financial Reporting Standards), maintains, in theory, the interests of the main stakeholders which 
are the majority of shareholders and managers, as well as the lenders (banks), minority shareholders, 
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employees, suppliers, customers and other partners such as contractors boards, NGOs, etc. In other 
words, the firm’s social responsibility is sometimes viewed even more broadly to include the 
protection of stakeholders who do not have a contractual relationship with the firm (Tirole, 2001). 
 
2.2. Corporate governance in an agency perspective  
 
In their seminal article of the positive theory of agency applied to problems of corporate 
governance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) considered that the agency relationship arises from the 
asymmetry of information that gives the manager opportunities to undertake actions unfavorable to 
shareholders without them noticing it. For instance, this basic agency problem suggests a possible 
definition of corporate governance as addressing both an adverse selection and a moral hazard 
problem (Tirole, 2001). 
Originally, corporate governance can be seen in an agency perspective, that is to say, a contract by 
which one or more persons (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to accomplish some 
services on their behalf implying the delegation of a part of the decision-making authority to the 
agent.  
Governance is reflected in the first place by the governing bodies of each organization. They are 
general assemblies which represent the categories of stakeholders and the administrative bodies 
which usually take the form of a Board of Directors. The problem amounts to control the activity of 
a delegation part of the responsibility, that’s why it is necessary to control those who have received 
that delegation.  
Given the diversity of mandates and competencies, which sometimes overlap, there is no single 
model of governance. However, some principles are vlid for all corporate governance models as 
we shall see below (§3). 
 
2.3. Positive agency theory (PAT) 
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Inspired from the approach of the theory of property rights, agency theory is now the dominant 
conception in corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). In agency theory, the company is designed as an implicit and explicit “nexus of contracts” 
governing relationships between the firm and its principal partners (i.e. creditors, managers). 
We highlight problems of asymmetric information and i complete contracts, and thus the moral 
hazard and adverse selection that result. These situations give rise to “agency costs” due to the fact
that each party seeks to maximize its own utility, even if it is to the detriment of the other. These 
agency costs can be classified into three categories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976): 
1. “cost of control” or “monitoring costs and incentives”; 
2. “cost of obligation” or “costs of court”; 
3. “residual costs” or “opportunity costs”. 
 
2.4. Theory of incentives (IT) 
 
IT reasons from a situation in which the under-informed party “the Principal” develops an incentive 
scheme to conduct the informed party “the Agent” to reveal his information (adverse selection 
model) or to behave in the interest of the Principal (moral hazard model). The incentive scheme is 
based on a conditional remuneration to “signals” reulting from the behavior of the Agent (as the 
choice of an option on a list of proposals called the “menu” of contracts, or as the result of his 
apparent effort when that effort itself is not observable). The existence of such an incentive scheme 
has been proved with two important assumptions (Brousseau and Glachant, 2002): 
1. Although the principal is “under-informed”, since he does not know the real value of the hidden 
variable, he knows both the probability law that affects this variable and the preference function 
of the agent. The Principal can get “in place” of the agent to anticipate his reactions to different 
remuneration schemes, and to select a scheme among the acceptable schemes to the Agent. 
2. There is a concealed institutional framework, but competent and benevolent, ensuring respect for 
commitments made by the Principal. So any proposal made by the Principal is credible for the 
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agent. On the other hand, the proposed remuneration scheme is based on information known as 
“verifiable”, in other words, observable by a third party. 
 
2.5. Theory of transaction costs (TCT) 
 
Transaction costs analysis is typically a problem of g vernance, i.e. of contractual relationships. 
This approach combines the contributions of legal research, and economic organization, in order to 
identify alternative methods of governance, to define relevant attributes, and to explain their relative 
performances (Williamson, 2000). 
New Institutional Economics works predominantly at two levels: the institutional environment, 
which includes both the formal (laws, polity, and ju iciary) and informal (customs, mores, norms) 
rules of the game, and the institutions of governance (markets, firms, bureaus) or play of the game 
(Williamson, 2000). 
Williamson has studied the factors that explain how individuals, that have a bounded rationality and 
that are immersed in an uncertain environment, organize their contractual relationships or more 
generally organize their transactions (make or buy). In doing so, Williamson builds a pragmatic 
analysis of transactions and transactional choices which lead him to set the choice of organizational 
structures (which he calls governance structure) that govern transactions (Chabaud, Glachant, 
Parthenay and Perez, 2008). 
According to Williamson, the three attributes of the transaction are: frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity (e.g. site, physical assets, human assets, lack of assets, active time). 
 
2.6. Theory of incomplete contracts (TIC) 
 
The theory of incomplete contracts has become a theory of the influence of institutions on the 
design of contracts while it was initially concerned with the impact that the allocation of property 
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rights may have on the distribution of the residual surplus between agents, and on their incentives to 
invest. 
The theory of incomplete contracts, of which Hart (1986) is a prominent founder, is a new paradigm 
in economics. This new paradigm considers that the complete contingent contracts, the contracts 
which imply that all future events that may affect the contractual relationship are considered in the 
original contract, are not the only types of contracts faced by agents. In reality, agents cannot always 
anticipate all obligations related to possible states of nature. Therefore, contracts between agents 
will be incomplete (Chabaud, Glachant, Parthenay and Perez, 2008). 
The contract incompleteness is the result of two hypotheses that characterize agents and the 
environment in which they evolve. On the one hand, agents are supposed to have bounded 
rationality. On the other hand, uncertainty (as defined by Knight, 1921) and complexity that 
characterize the environment they face mean that agents cannot anticipate all future contingencies. 
 
3. Governance modes 
 
We shall focus on the basic modes of governance, i.e. corporate governance and public governance. 
In addition, this quest for governance modes may be best expressed in territorial governance with 
the development of methods for Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in support of projects of public 
interest. 
 
3.1. Corporate governance principles 
 
The principles of corporate governance of the OECD have been approved in 1999 by the ministers 
of OECD countries and have since then emerged as a reference at the international level (OECD, 
2004). 
These principles of corporate governance include basics which underlie the “good” corporate 
governance: establishment of the foundations for an effective corporate governance regime, 
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shareholder rights and main functions of shareholders, equitable treatment of shareholders, role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, transparency and dissemination of information and 
responsibilities of the Board of Directors (OECD, 2004).  
In that perspective, a “good” governance structure is then one that selects the most able managers 
and makes them accountable to investors. Many authors ave therefore advocated moving from 
traditional shareholder value to the broader concept of the “stakeholder society” in which the 
interests of non-investing parties would be better rep esented (Tirole, 2001). 
 
3.2. Corporate governance and risk management  
 
Corporate governance concerns the management of firms. As such, it is concerned by the 
management of investments, their returns, the ways tho e are shared and future developments, i.e. 
financial risks. However, in any industries, there a other risks that have to be managed in parallel: 
technical risks and hazards. Hazards can be prevented to some extent and most of them may be 
insured (whether auto-insured, or through contracts with insurance companies). These are 
manageable at the level of a firm. 
In the context of corporate governance, we identify three groups of hazard causes that may affect a 
company: technical risks (inoperative machine, fire, etc.), deviant behavior (theft, attacks, etc.) and
natural phenomena (volcanoes, floods, etc.) (Ledoux, 1995). 
 
3.3. Public governance   
 
There is no consensus on a definition of public governance, yet there are many international 
organizations (such as World Bank, Governance Institute in Canada, the United Nations 
Development Program, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and the European Commission) that have worked to make the 
concept more precise. Consequently, governance is understood in different ways reflecting the 
interests and objectives of the issuer organizations (Fabre, Meisel and Ould, 2007). 
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In short, we admit that public governance refers to the participatory interaction between 
government, private firms, organizations of civil society and citizens in order to ensure an optimal 
use of resources and an increase in the quality of services provided by the State which implies the 
improvement of the quality of life for citizens and their shares of goods. This remark particularly 
concerns public goods, i.e. goods and services which everyone benefits from and characterized by 
non-rivalry in terms of consumption (Harribey, 2011). 
 
3.4. Management in public organizations and New Public Management  
 
The notion of governance requires a global approach of objectives and methods, one of its most 
important objectives is the modernization of public administration and the verification of the 
existence of quality of life indicators for citizens such as education and health which are costs for 
the state but considered as long term investments for a sustainable development. 
A public policy does not respond to the same needs than the private sector and we may well reject 
the idea of comparing the government methods to methods of corporate governance. Although, 
supposed to meet the current needs of the reform of public organizations, management methods 
traditionally used in the private sector have been gradually widespread in the public sector of many 
countries, forming the current New Public Management (NPM). 
The NPM relies on taking into account the market in public policy and relies often on approaches of 
privatization, or outsourcing of a part of the public sector activities through the creation of agencis 
or autonomous public institutions (Bartoli, 2005). Thus, the NPM introduces an approach of 
performance in the State services in passing from the logic of means to the logic of results. 
However, the results of NPM should be observed withcertain decline. This relative success of NPM 
may originate from dysfunctions related to its application. 
 
3.5. Evaluation of governance by international organizations 
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There is obviously no consensus on the definition of “g od governance” than on the definition of 
governance itself. However, an effective public service, a reliable legal system and an accountable 
administration to its users are the central elements of good governance into which all definitions 
converge (Fabre, Meisel and Ould, 2007). 
It is important to note that the evaluation of the governance for countries around the world by 
international organizations has become of major importance over the years. Here are some of them: 
• Indicators of the OECD: rule of law, public sector management, control of corruption and reducing 
military spending. 
• Indicators of the United Nations: citizen participat on, rule of law, transparency, citizen 
satisfaction, alignment of interest, equality especially for opportunities, effectiveness, existence of 
a system of punishment and accountability and the srategic vision to promote the growth of the 
society. 
• Indicators of the World Bank: the World Bank plays a leading role in this field; both economists 
Kaufmann and Kraay (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010) are updating the version of the 
World Governance Indicators (WGI). According to these two economists, it is possible to divide 
the governance into six principal components by taking as a starting point the late 90 in order to 
apply them on developed and developing countries as follows: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiv ness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
of corruption. 
 
3.6. Public Private Partnership (PPP)  
 
The PPP aims to define a legal framework for relationships that bind the public sector to the private 
sector, and to organize cooperation between the two sectors. It refers, however, to all infrastructure 
projects that benefit the economy and which the private sector can contribute through financing, 
installation, maintenance, modernization or management. 
 
3.7. Political regimes referring to the precautionary principle 
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The communication of the European Commission (2000) indicates that the precautionary principle 
should be considered in the context of a structured approach in risk analysis (evaluation, 
management and communication). The reference to the precautionary principle assumes that 
potentially dangerous effects have been identified, but the evaluation does not allow determining the 
risk with sufficient scientific certainty. 
 
4. Public governance and risk management  
 
To exceptional situations, exceptional remedy! The State, upon the occurrence of a catastrophic 
risk, becomes the pivot of the rescue operation in order to counteract the crises considered 
sometimes as being uninsurable. 
Collective risk management has become one of the major themes of public debate particularly in 
terms of the effective implementation of the precautionary principle. Hence numerous tools have 
been developed for this purpose. However, for less exceptional situations of risk, a number of 
instruments and methods have been developed. 
 
4.1. Insurance, reinsurance and financial markets  
 
The principal tools to managing and sharing risks vary on a large scale between insurance, 
reinsurance and the financial market (Godard, Henry, Lagadec and Michel-Kerjan, 2002): 
• Insurance: An insured pays a certain price (the premium) to receive a certain amount of money 
(compensation) if the hazard (for which he is insured) happens. Notice that the principle of 
insurance relies on a great number of independent risks insured by the same company. 
• Reinsurance: According to the French Federation of I surance Companies (FFSA), reinsurance is 
a service provided by reinsurers by which all or part of the risk subscribed by another insurer is 
assumed by them in return for remuneration. Due to the reinsurance transaction, the insurer may 
invest premiums he perceives into two parts: a riskless one over a long term and short term 
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contracts with the reinsurer in order to hedge the “risky” part of his insurance portfolio. 
Reinsurance makes the link between insurance (and thus individually insured people) and financial 
markets. 
• Financial market: Tools have been developed to hedge many risks and even some catastrophic 
risks. Reinsurance hedges its position financial instruments exchanged on the stock market. Three 
main tools have been implemented: Index options from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) on 
the occurrence of a disaster on the Chicago market, th  swaps of Catastrophe Risk Exchange 
(CATEX) of New York and the Bermuda Commodities Exchange (BCE) established in spring 
1997 as a disaster swap market for catastrophe risk ba ed on Guy Carpenter’s catastrophe index 
(GCCI) (Bruggeman, 2007). We’ll see an example in section 5.2. 
 
5. Territorial governance  
 
The term “territory” may refer to the national territo y of an administrative area in which the State 
(by its headquarters) shall exercise its sovereignty. The notion of territory contains three different 
but complementary dimensions.  Firstly, an identity dimension that is characterized by its name, 
limitations, history, heritage and the way by which the inhabitants of the territory represent it. 
Secondly, a material dimension, which designs the territory as a space with natural and physical 
properties which are characterized by their structure and their dynamic in time and space. Last but 
not least, an organizational dimension in which the territory is an entity with an organization of 
social and institutional actors. 
The concept of territorial governance consists of new modes of organization, coordination and 
management of a territory. It refers also to the governance of several countries or part of them, 
which share a common concern. In the Mediterranean t rritory case, some Mediterranean countries 
(e.g. Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey) are prone to seismic and tsunami risks. Others (e.g. 
Morroco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) are conerned by their desert climates. Last but not 
least, a number of Mediterranean countries such as South of France, Italy, Spain, and Greece where 
urban areas are threatened by sea-flood risk. However, territorial governance corresponds to the 
increased involvement of public and private actors in the dynamic of development in a given 
territory. 
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The territory as a social construct, economic and spatial, calls for a particular organization 
depending on the type of actors that dominate it. In his sense, Leloup, Moyart and Pecqueur (2005) 
have identified three types of coordination: private coordination, where the dominant actor is a 
private organization, public or institutional coordination and a joint coordination which is a mix of 
the two precedents. 
This coordination mobilizes the cooperation among different interest groups (business, civil society, 
professional associations, NGOs, etc.) whose objectives may be different, even contradictory, but 
which contribute to the production of development factors of this common territory. However, 
development is no longer a purely economic matter, i  also relates to social equity and to the 
conservation of nature and resources. Thus, territorial governance requires, first, to overcome the 
administrative vision of the territory and to apprehend it as a pluri-dimensional social construct. 
 
5.1. Features of a good territorial governance 
 
Like other forms of governance (private, public, etc.). There is no consensus on the definition of 
good territorial governance in adequacy with the sustainable character of the territory. However, a 
set of features are valid for all models in order to ensure sound governance, known by the generic 
term of “good territorial governance”. 
Territorial governance should enable technology transfer and the diffusion of the know-how in 
partner countries (use of waste management methods with low environmental impact, for example). 
It should also enable the proliferation of research centers that would facilitate the social innovation 
process in a perspective of integrated territorial development. All of the above explain the 
increasing interest in territorial governance that focus on longer terms than those of a country where 
interest is usually tied to election’s terms. 
 
5.2. Territorial governance and risk management 
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Let’s take as an example of a large scale environmental hazard to which the Mediterranean territory 
is widely sensitive, i.e. seismic risk. In fact, among the largest earthquakes in the world, there is the 
Mediterranean territory ranging from Turkey to Lebanon passing by Italy and to the south of France. 
Indeed, an earthquake concerns people from medium ter  to long term. So, it is worthy to bring a 
sample of actors of these populations and their decision makers to establish plans to reduce the 
vulnerability of this region to this particular hazard. 
The components to be determined are particularly: the frequency of earthquakes, the situation of the 
Mediterranean, the expected date for the occurrence of an earthquake, the good practices to be 
undertaken in urban development and architecture. 
As for the involved actors, the working group will be formed by a committee of wise (of different 
formations) rather than a traditional steering committee (the formal elected of the countries) and that
is to prevent the manifestation of the political cleavages which adversely affects the quality of 
substantive discussions. Given the type of the problem raised, we need, among others, the following 
skills: civil engineering, management, economics, geology, sociology, seismology, and 
econometrics. 
The animation of working groups may use non-prospectiv  methods (Metaplan, Design reviews, 
Brainstorming, etc.) and prospective methods (Actors, Matrix analysis, Morphological analysis, 
Forecasts, Projections, Scenario, Future diagram, Utopia, Dystopia, Eutopia, Vision of the future, 
etc.) in order to organize proactive policies. 
 
Due to the extent of the work to be undertaken, pros ective plans for the medium and the long term, 
including several scenarios identified as probable by the committee should be established. A 
difficult issue that arises is to accept the costs involved in the process, that is why, in addition t 
representatives of the local population and experts, the politicians of the concerned territories should 
take part in the procedure. 
These costs include: research investment, earthquake-resistant buildings, the structuring of the 
regional and cities networks, the development of prgrams of cooperation and communication, the 
becoming of the rural areas, the evolution of the agricultural structures, etc. The implementation and
functioning of such a heavy structure requires a real commitment to the future. If these requirements 
are obtained, then a private corporation may be interes ed in taking interest, this is what happened 
concerning the Mediterranean region: Swis-Re has been able to develop specific instruments to help 
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governments and local agencies to manage seismic risks. This is the result of a wide cooperation 
between the public and the private sector. On June 1st 2007, Swiss-Re obtained US$ 100 Million 
protection against earthquake risk in Turkey, Greece, Israel, Portugal and Cyprus. 
The problem has been solved even though it was complicated by the references to different 
countries, regulations and hazards. The special sponsor vehicle to issue the cat-bonds, is MedQuake 
ltd. The real issuer is Swiss-Re with a retrocession agreement between the two companies. 
MedQuake issued notes that cover severe earthquake risk (measured by a parametric trigger) in the 
countries at stake, from May 2007 to May 2010. There were two classes of issues, with different 
ratings (depending on two different risky parts in the portfolio of the issuer) for the same 
redemption date (June 2010). 
 
Class Rating Size in M US$ Coupon (spread in basis 
points to LIBOR 3month 
rate) 
A BB- 50 355 
B B 50 510 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our interest is focused on risk management in a multi-level governance in which the interaction 
between levels is provided by contracts. Thus, the contracting process may take place between: two 
independent companies, the company and the administration, different levels of government, the 
company and international agencies or the administrat on and an international body, etc.  
Several characteristics are of a particular importance in the case of the contractual approach of risk 
management. The following includes a few of them: the vulnerability of the territory, the 
competence of the contracting party, the complexity of the field of action, the institutional 
environment in place, the degree of independence between the national and local policies in risk 
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management, the legal context in which the contracting parties operate, the severity and probability 
of occurrence of the encountered risks, etc. 
In such a contract, we note that: the private sector seeks to reduce its vulnerability, the public sector 
expects to increase the insurability of citizens against those risks, and the territorial actors expect to 
provide a satisfactory assurance of good conduct of the territorial project, on common hazards. In all 
cases, contracts should be geared towards learning a d improving efficiency. Thus, the audit should 
enable to study the origin of the effectiveness of g vernance practices and to define the potential 
utility of the lessons learned in a different context (OECD, 2007). 
In this context, we highlight the fact that the formation of institutions may take a very long time. 
This process of institutionalization consists of three phases: the externalization, the objectivation 
and the internalization of routines, which become th  “natural order” of things. Those Institutions 
are the conventions, norms and formally sanctioned rules of a society. They provide expectations, 
stability and meaning essential to human existence a d coordination (Vatn, 2005). 
It is clear that radical uncertainty, when it is not even possible to conceive a number of assumptions, 
the completeness of the contracts is impossible (Ghestin, 2000). In this case, as for example in the 
case of catastrophe risk, central government turns out to be the insurer of last resort. This former 
often lacks the “good” governance for an intended public welfare that exceeds short terms vision 
such as elections’ dates. 
For instance, we can argue that if an improvement is o be made in favor of citizens, this 
improvement must rest on a conscious consideration of governance. Clearly, such elements lead 
observers to ponder various governance structures and to compare different risk management across 
countries. In that perspective, we assume that a better comprehension of our subject lays on a case 
by case study of different risks (e.g. waste management, earthquake and volcano) that a territory, a 
nation or an organization may face. To better understand issues related to governance dealing with 
risks, other applied researches, involving different institutional structures, have to be conducted. 
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